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THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE'S RESTATEMENT OF
THE LAW OF TORTS WITH ANNOTATIONS TO
THE KENTUCKY DECISIONS*
BY ANDREW J. RUSSELL**
Chapter IV.
CONDUCT VIOLATING THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM FROM
CONFINEMENT [FALSE IMPRISONMENT].
Section 49. Causing a confinement of another for any
appreciable time within limits fixed by the one causing the
confinement, unless privileged, subjects the one causing the
confinement to a liability to the other if
(a) the other knows of his confinement; and
(b) it is not consented to by the other, and
(c) it is caused
(i) by an act intended so to confine the other or a
third party, or
(ii) by a breach of a duty to protect or release the
other, from confinement, however threatened or
imposed.
Annotation
The plaintiff must allege in the petition that the confinment was
done maliciously and without probable cause. Dierg v. So. Co. & Cf. B.
Go. (1903), 24 Ky. L. Rep. 1825, 72 S. W. 355.
Section 50. (1) To create liability under Section 49 the
confinement must be complete, if there is any reasonable means
of escape there is no confinement.
(2) The intentional interference with or obstruction of
another's movement in a particular direction is not a confine-
ment.
* Note.-This is the second installment prepared by the author
and published in the Kentucky Law Journal. Others will follow in
subsequent editions of this Journal.
** Andrew J. Russell, A. B., Berea College, 1926; LL. B. Yale
University, 1928; Associated with Dean Robert M. Hutchins and Mr.
Donald Slessinger In the preparation of articles on the law of Bin-
dence and Psychology; Professor of Law, School of Law, University
of Louisville, since 1929.
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(a) A unlawfully encloses a part of the highway B enters
the enclosure and A prevents him from passing out of it on the
other side but puts no obstacle in the way of his leaving by the
way in winch he entered. Tins is not an actionable confinement
of B, though B has the right to unobstructed passage along the
highway
Annotation
The plaintiff was transferred from a poor house to the institution
of the defendant where she stayed for a number of years. She escaped
and sued for false imprisonment. The court held that the question
was properly left to the jury and the jury found that she could have
left at any time she desired, therefore, no false imprisonment Smith
v, S#sters of Good Shepherd of Louisville (1914), 27 Ky. L. Rep. 1170,
87 S. W. 1076.
(3) A means of escape is not reasonable if its use involves
danger of bodily harm to the other or a third person or of sub-
stantial harm to property of the other or a third person, or
involves an indecorum so gross, that a reasonable man would
submit to confinement rather than commit it.
(b) A locks B, an athletic young man, in a room with an
open window at the height of four feet from the floor and from
the ground outside. A has not confined B.
(e) A locks B, who is suffering from a disease winch makes
any considerable exertion dangerous to him, in such a room as
supposed in the previous illustration (b) A has confined B.
(d) A closes every exit from a place where B is except one,
winch B can only use by doing some act winch would threaten
C with substantial bodily injury A has confined B.
(,e) A closes every exit except one, the use of winch would
involve material injury to B's clothing. A has confined B.
(f) A is naked in a Turkish bath. B locks the door into
the dressing room but leaves open the door to the general waiting




(4) A meais of escape is reasonable although it mvolves
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an invasion of a third person's right to the exclusive possession
of his real property, if the invasion neither causes harm to its
physical condition nor interferes with its use.
(g) A closes every exit from a place in which B is except
one which leads over C's vacant lot. A has not confined B.
Annotation
No Kentucky decisions.
(5) The limits within which the other is confined may be
wide.
(h) A by an invalid process restrains B within prison
limits which are coterinnous with the boundaries of a consider-
able town. A has confined B.
(i) A serves upon B an invalid writ purporting to restrain
B from leaving a particular State of the United States. B sub-
mits, believing the writ to be valid. A has confined B.
(j) A wrongfully prevents B from entering the United
States. A has not confined B, although B, in a sense, may be




One who by force or threats of force or by asserting a legal
authority compels another to accompany him from place to place
has as effectively confined the other as if he had locked him in a
room.
(k) A kidnaps B and carries him in a motor ear across
three States. A has confined B in each State.
(1) A compels B by the assertion of an invalid legal author-
ity to accompany him. A has confined B.
Annotation
Accord. The defendant under assertion of legal authority com-
pelled the plaintiff to accompany him from Kentucky into Ohio where
he was accused of committing a felony. Botts v. Williams (1857), 56
Ky. 687.
Section 51. A confinement intentionally imposed creates
A. L. I. RESTATEMENT OF LAW OF TORTS
liability however short its duration and although it violates no
right of the other except is right to freedom from conscious
confinement.
(a) A arrests B under an invalid legal process and re-
leases him immediately A is liable to B.
Annotation
The defendant, a town marshal, detained the plaintiff for a few
minutes threatening him with arrest. In holding the defendant liable
for false imprisonment Lewis J. said: "Any deprivation of liberty
of the plaintiff by the defendant without the plaintiff's consent and
against his will whether it was by actual force, threats, or otherwise,
constitutes an arrest." Miller v. Ashcraft (1895), 98 Ky. 314, 17 Ky. L.
Rep. 894, 32 S. W 1085.
Section 52. If an act is done with the intention stated in
Section 61 (1) and causes a confinement to another, it is imma-
terial whether the act directly or indirectly causes the confine-
ment.
Annotation
Section 36 of the Kentucky Criminal Code provides that: "A peace
officer may make an arrest.
"1. In obedience to a warrant of arrest delivered to him.
"2. Without a warrant, when a public offense is committed in his
presence, or when he has reasonable ground for believing that the
person arrested has committed a felony.
"3. That such peace officer with a warrant of arrest, when in
actual pursuit of an offender, may cross a county line for the purpose
of making the arrest in the adjoining county."
The sheriff is not liable in false imprisonment for the wrongful
arrest by his deputy acting in the scope of his authority. The deputy is
acting in the scope of his authority only when he complies with Sec-
tion 36 of the Criminal Code. Jones v. Van Bever (1915), 164 Ky. 80,
174 S. W 795, L. R. A. 1915 E. 172.
Same type cases grow out of a situation where a private concern
employs a peace officer as a watchman.
If the watchman is acting out of the scope of his authority in his
capacity as either a watchman or peace officer he only is liable. Jones
v. Van Bever, supra; Cope v. Askins (1925), 208 Ky. 86, 270 S. W. 454.
If the watchman is acting as a duly authorized officer of the state,
executing a warrant duly sworn out, his private employer is not
liable. McKinney Steel Co. v. Beloher (1924), 205 Ky. 453, 266 S. W
42.
If the alleged officer fails to notify, of course, he cannot act as
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an agent of the state, but his private employer is liable in false im-
prisonment for a wrongful arrest. The duty is on his private employer
to know that the actor is duly qualified. Cf. N. 0. & T. P Ry. Co. v.
Cundiff (1915), 166 Ky. 594, 179 S. W. 615, Ann. Cas. 1916 C. 513.
The employer is liable where the watchman is acting only in the
furtherance of the employer's interest. L. & X. Ry. Co. v. Owens (1915),
164 Ky. 557, 175 S. W 1039. L. & N. Ry. Co. v. Offutt (1924), 204 Ky.
51, 263 S. W 665.
One making misrepresentations causing another's arrest is liable
for false imprisonment of the person so arrested. Huggns v. Toler
(1866), 64 Ky. (1 Bush) 192.
A car had been stolen from the defendant. The plaintiff was ar-
rested in another town having sold a car that met the description of
the one stolen. The officer notified the defendant and he told them
to hold the car. The defendant sent a representative and car was re-
leased the next day. The plaintiff sues the defendant for false im-
prisonment. The court held that he was not liable because there was
not sufficient ratification of the arrest. He did not tell the officers to
hold the plaintiff but to hold- the car. Triangle Motor Co. v. Smith
(1926), 216 Ky. 479, 287 S. W 914.
One who swears to an affidavit causing the arrest of another, even
though he acts maliciously is not guilty of false imprisonment. The
remedy of one so injured is in malicious prosecution. Roberts v.
Thomas (1909), 135 Ky. 63, 121 S. W. 961, 21 Ann. Cas. 456; Harper v.
Howton (1922), 194 Ky. 840, 241 S. W 329.
Comment
The sense in which the words "causes", "directly", and
"indirectly" are used in the Restatement is stated in Section 6,
Comment.
Section 53. Confinement may be by"
(a) physical barriers,
(b) physical force,
(c) the threat of physical force,
(d) the assertion of an apparent legal authority
Annotation
No Kentucky decisions.
Section 54. (1) The confinement may be by actual or ap-
parent physical bamers.
(2) There is a confinement by physical barriers if (a) the
barriers are actually efficient to restrain the other, or (b),
though actually inefficient to do so, the other believes them to
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be efficient and the one setting the barriers intends hum so to
believe.
(a) A locks the door of a room in which B is sitting. A
knows, but believes that B does not know, that there is an un-
locked but concealed door through which B could, if he knew of
it, escape. B does not know of the unlocked door. A has con-
fined B.
(3) An act which prevents another from availing hiinself
of a reasonable means of escape from the area of confinement
is a sufficient physical barner.
(b) A takes away the crutches from B, a cripple, who is
unable to walk without them. A has confined B.
(c) A removes the ladder which is the only available means
by which B can get out of a well. A has confined B.
Annotation
No Kentucky decisions.
Section 55. (1) The confinement may be by compulsion
of physical force or by submission thereto.
(a) A lays hold upon B and detains him notwithstanding
B's efforts to escape. A has confined B.
(2) It is not necessary that the physical force should be
such as to overcome the resistance of an ordinary man, it is
sufficient that physical force is exerted upon the person of an-
other and that such other is restrained thereby or, without
resistance, submits thereto.
(b) A, a small and weak man, takes hold of B's coat for
the purpose of detaining him against his will. B is a much
larger man and could, with a little exertion, free himself at once.
B submits. A has confined B.
Annotation
No Kentucky decisions.
Section 56. (1) The confinement may be by submission
to threats of physical force.
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(2) The threat may be by any act, including the mere
speakng of words, done for the purpose of putting and putting
the other in apprehension of the unmediate application of
physical force to his person or to the person of a member of his
immediate family, if he does not remain within the area within
which it is the actor's intention to confine him.
onmemnt
The term "member of the inmediate family", as used in this
Section, includes a spouse, parent or child, grandparent or grand-
child, brother or sister, by blood or adoption, whether members
of the same household or not.
(a) A is seated in a room. B stands at the door some feet
away and says to A. "If you attempt to leave this room I will
knock you down" B makes no threatening gesture. A, in
submission to the threat, remains in the room. B has confined A.
(b) A and his child are seated in a room. B, with a
revolver in his hand, is standing m close vicinity to A's child. B
threatens to shoot A's child if A leaves the room. A, in submis-
sion to the threat, remains in the room. B has confined A.
(3) The submission must be to a threat to apply the phy-
sical force immediately upon the other's going or attempting
to go beyond the area within which the threat is intended to
confine him. I
(c) A threatens B that if he leaves the room he, A, will
shoot him the next time he meets him on the street. B, in sub-
mission to the threat, remains in the room. A has not con-
fined B.
(4) The other must submit to the threat by remainng
within the limits fixed by the actor's will in- order to avoid or
avert the force threatened to the other or a member of his
immediate family
(d) A threatens B that he will shoot him if he tries to leave
the room. B knows that A has no weapon. B stays in the room.
B has not submitted to A's threats.
(5) It is not necessary that the force threatened be such
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that a reasonable man would submit to confinement rather than
undergo it; it is sufficient that one threatens physical force
with the intention of confining another and that the other sub-
mits thereto.
Annotation
No Kentucky decisions to any of Section 56.
Section 57. (1) Confinement may be by taking a person
into custody under an asserted legal authority.
Annotation
As to what constitutes legal authority, or under what conditions
a peace officer or private citizen may make an arrest see the chapter
on "Arrest," Sections 139 to 164.
(a) A has in his possession an invalid warrant of arrest.
:He serves it upon B, who, believing it to be valid, submits thereto.
A has confined B.
(b) A, a private citizen, obtains a policeman's uniform and
badge. While wearing both, he says to B "I arrest you."
The circumstances are such that a policeman, but not a private
citizen, would be privileged to arrest hm. B, believing A to
be a policemen, submits. A has confined B.
Annotation
The plaintiff was arrested by defendant under a "coplas pro fine."
The defendant pleaded in this action for false imprisonment that the
precept "directed" him to make the arrest. The court held that the
plea was bad. He should have pleaded that it commanded him to act
as he did. Smith v. McGuire (1824), 15 Ky. (5 Litt.) 302.
The arrest must be by want of lawful authority to constitute false
imprisonment. Roberts v. Thomas (1909), 135 Ky. 63, 121 S. W 961,
21 Ann. Cas. 456.
(2) The custody is complete if the person against whom
and in whose presence the authority is asserted believes it to
be valid or is in doubt as to its validity and submits thereto.
(c) A, a traffic policeman, is standing by his bicycle at the
side of the highway He calls to B, who is passing in Ins auto-
mobile: "You are under arrest. Follow me." B knows that
A could not catch up with hun if he drives on. B turns and fol-




(3) If the person against whom an invalid authority is as-
serted does not submit, a mere touching does not constitute a
confinement. In such case there must be actual restraint by
physical barriers or physical force or submission to threats
thereof.
(d) A attempts to arrest B under an invalid warrant which
he exhibits to B. He touches B on the shoulder, saying- "I
arrest you." B knows that the warrant is invalid but runs away
to avoid the possibility that A might attempt to enforce the
warrant by physical'restramt. A hag not confined B.
Annotation
No Kentucky decisions.
(4) The submission necessary to convert the assertion of
authority ino a custody taken thereunder may be shown by
words or conduct.
(e) A serves upon B a warrant purporting to give hnn
authority to arrest B for nonpayment of taxes. B refuses to pay
the taxes unless he is arrested. A says "I arrest you." B pays
the taxes. B has submitted to the- arrest and A has taken B
into custody
Annotation
Defendant caused a policeman to arrest plaintiff and hold him
until plaintiff paid defendant money which plaintiff owed defendant.
Held to be false imprisonment. Foor v. Combs (1894), 15 Ky. L. Rep.
845.
(5) It is inmaterial whether a mistake winch leads the
other to submit to the asserted authority is a mistake of law
or of fact.
(f) A exhibits to B a warrant invalid on its face, purport-
ing to authorize A to arrest B. B inspects the warrant and be-
lieves it to be valid and submits to arrest. A is liable to B.
(g) A is injured by a railroad tram. B, the conductor
of the train, tells A that he has the authority to detain A until A
A. L. I. IttSTATEmz T op tAw oF TORTS
makes a statement as to his conduct which has contributed to his
injury by the tram. A, through ignorance of the law, believes
that B has the authority which her asserts and gives the state-
ment which B desires m order to obtain his release from deten-
tion. B is liable to A.
(h) A is guilty of conduct which gives to any police officer
authority to arrest him. B impersonates an officer and takes A
into custody for the crime. A, believing that B is a police officer
and as such has authority to take him into custody, submits.
B is liable to A.
Annotation
No Kentucky decisions.
(6) Compliance with a demand which one makes upon
another under threat that unless the other complies therewith
one will take hun into custody under a warrant or other as-
serted authority, is not submission thereto.
(i) A exhibits an invalid warrant to B and threatens to
arrest hun unless B will pay him a sum of money B, to avoid
arrest, pays the money B has not submitted to A's custody
and is not confined.
(j) A telephones B that he has a warrant for B's arrest
which he will serve unless B appears before Magistrate C on the
following morning. B, to avoid arrest under the warrant, ap-
pears before Magistrate C. B has not submitted to the warrant
and is not confined.
Annotation
On a conflict of evidence it is for the jury to determine whether
the plaintiff voluntarily accompanied the defendant or did so by com-
pulsion. Crocker v. Haley (1906), 29 Ky. L. Rep. 174, 92 S. W.. 574. But
the Court of Appeals will set aside such a finding when it is flagrantly
against the evidence. Kroger Grocery & Bakery Co. v. Piaggenburg
(1923), 199 Ky. 551, 251 S. W. 650.
Plaintiff an infant under an agreement to train horses was urged
to go to Louisville and then to New York. After returning he sues for
false imprisonment. The court held that there was no evidence of
compulsion, even though the agreement was an attempt to apprentice
an infant, and invalid because it did not follow the statutory require-
ments. Brooks v. Madden (1923), 198 Ky. 167, 248 S. W. 503.
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The plaintiff after quitting work was ordered back to work by
the defendant's superintendent because the plaintiff owed the super-
intendent money. Even though a man secured by the superintendent
watched the plaintiff that night while he was working it was held
not to be false imprisonment because the court held that he returned
to work by his own free will. Keel v. Steel (oal (o., et a. (1925), 207
Ky. 431, 269 S. W. 53L
(7) The authority must be asserted in the other's presence.
(k) A telephones to B that he has a warrant for B's arrest
and that he arrests B thereunder. B answers: "All right,
what must I do" A replies "You are to appear before
Magistrate 0 at ten o'clock tomorrow." B appears before
Magistrate C at the appointed time. A has not taken B into
custody and has not "arrested" B if he has a valid warrant,




(8) Submission by another to a process which one asserts
to be in one's possession is a confinement, although there is no
such process or one does not have it in one's possession or if
it is in one's possession, it is not exhibited to the other.
(1) A meets B and says. "I have a warrant for your
arrest." B, believing A to have such a warrant, submits and
goes with him. A has confined B whether (a) he has such a war-
rant in his possession but does not exhibit it to B, or (b) such a
warrant has been issued but is not in A's possession, or (e) no
such warrant has been issued.
Annotation
No Kentucky decisions.
Section 58. The intentional confinement of another, if
privileged, creates no liability
Comment
As to the circumstances under which the intentional inposi-
tion of conscious confinement upon another is privileged, see
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Sections 86 and 99. The circumstances which create the privi-
lege must be alleged and proved by one who relies upon it to
displace a liability to which he would otherwise be subject.
Annotation
No Kentucky decisions.
Section 59. There is no liability for intentionally confin-
ing another unless the person physically restrained knows of
the confinement.
(a) A, a schoolmaster, refuses to permit B to go home for
the holidays, though B's father asks that he shall be permitted
to come home. B is ignorant of the restraint put upon his
liberty A is not liable to B.
(b) A calls an employee, B, into his office to explain his
connection with speculations which have been going on n A's
business and stations a guard at the door with instructions not to
let B leave the room unless A sounds a buzzer, B does not know
of these instructions. B's explanations are satisfactory The
buzzer is not sounded and B is allowed to pass unhindered. A as
not liable to B.
(c) A locks the only door of a room in which B, a child of
two is playing. B knows that the key has been turned but does
not realize that he is restrained thereby A has not confined B.
(d) A is spending the night at B's house. On waking, A
discovers that the door to the room in which he is sleeping as
locked. B has locked the door with the intention of confining A.
A believes that the door was locked by B's little son in fun. B
has confined A.
Annotation
Accord. "False imprisonment is the unlawful restraint of a per-
son contrary to his will either with or without process of law. Reynods
v. Przce (1900), 22 Ky. L. :Rep. 5, 56 S. W. 502.
Section 60. Causing a confinement of another does not
subject one causing it to a liability if the other has consented
thereto.
comment
As to what constitutes Consent, see Sections 66-77
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Section 61. (1) To create the liability stated in Section
49 an act winch causes a confinement of another but winch
invades no legally protected interest of the other except his
interest in freedom from confinement, must be done with the
the intention of bringing about a confinement.
(2) An act winch, while causing a confinement of another
is not done with the intention stated in Subsection (1) and
invades no interest of the other except his interest in freedom
from confinement, does not create liability although a reason-
able man, under the circumstances winch the actor knows or
should know, would recognize the probability that the act
would cause a confinement.
(a) A, carelessly forgetting that he has told his assistant,
B, to work overtime, locks the door of ins office at the usual clos-
ing time. B telephones the janitor, who promptly releases him.
A is not liable to B.
Annotation
No Kentucky decisions.
Section 62. An act is done with the intention of bringing
about a confinement of another if it is done for the purpose of
bringing about such a confinement of the other or with knowl-
edge that such a confinement will result from the act.
Annotation
No Kentucky decisions.
Section 63. An act winch is intended to affect a third
party in the manner stated in Section 62 but wich imnposes a
conscious confinement upon another creates liability to the
other as fully as though it were intended so to affect him.
(a) A locks the door of ins office for the purpose of confin-
ing B, ins clerk. A knows that 0, a client whom he has no desire
to confine, is in the office. Since A locks the door for the purpose
of confining B, he intends to confine B. A, though having no
desire to confine , knows that his act will'confine C and there-
fore intends to confine C.
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(b) A, knowing that his shop is full of customers, locks its
only door in order to prevent a mob from breaking it and looting
it. This is a confinement of Ins customers. A, though having no
desire to confine his customers, knows that Ins act will confine
them and, therefore, intends to confine them.
(c) A and B are in a room. C has no reason to know and
does not know of B's presence in the room. C locks the door for
the purpose of confining A. 0 is not privileged to confine
either A or B. C does not intend to confine B but since B is con-
fined by C's act intended to confine A, C is liable to B.
Annotation
No Kentucky decisions.
Section 64. If an act which causes the confinement of
another is done with the intention stated in Section 62 it-creates
liability although it is not inspired by personal hostility or
desire to offend.
Annotation
"A pure, naked, unlawful retention unaffected by any question of
motive or purpose constitutes false imprisonment two things
are necessary- (1) detention of the person, (2) the unlawfulness of
the detention. Actual force is not necessary the unlawfulness
of the detention is the gravamen of the offense, hence it may be com-
mitted without malice on the part of the person causing the detention.
Consequently the question of malice is immaterial except as it may
affect the question of damages." Reynolds v. Pnce (1900), 22 Ky. L.
Rep. 5, 56 S. W 502.
The defendant was summoned by one whom he thought to be a
deputy to help arrest the plaintiff. In fact the one so representing was
not an officer at all. He had not qualified. The court held the defend-
ant liable in an action for false imprisonment holding that every
citizen is bound to assist a known public officer, but the burden is on
the one summoned to know that the one summoning him is a public
officer. 0. N. 0. & T. P By. Go. v. Cundiff (1915), 166 Ky. 594, 179 S. W
615, Ann. Cas. 1916C 513.
The defendant, a police judge, acting on authority of a telegram
from an officer in Alabama, had plaintiff placed in jall. In an action
for false imprisonment the lower court instructed the jury in sub-
stance that plaintiff could not recover unless he could show that de-
fendant "acted without honest conviction of duty and with corrupt
and improper motives." The Court of Appeals held this instruction to
be erroneous and that his motive was immaterial, that since the de-
fendant had no jurisdiction to act he was liable. Glazar v. Hubbard
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(1897), 102 Ky. 68, 19 Ky. L. Rep. 1025, 42 S. W. 1114, 80 Am. S. R.
340, 39 L. R. A. 210.
(2) There iz no general duty to protect or release another
from confinement.
Annotation
Section 45 of the Kentucky Criminal Code of -practice provides
that: "The officer making the arrest in obedience to a warrant shall
proceed with the defendant as directed by the warrant."
Section 46 of the Kentucky Criminal Code of Practice provides
that: "If an arrest be made without a warrant, whether by a peace
officer or a private person, the defendant shall forthwith be carried
before the most convenient magistrate in the county in which the
arrest is made, and the ground on which the arrest was made shall
be stated to the magistrate; and if the offense for which the arrest
was made be charged to have been committed in a different county
from that in which the arrest was made, and the magistrate believe,
from the statement made to him on oath, that there are sufficient
grounds for an examination, he shall, by his written order, commit
the defendant to a peace officer to be conveyed by him before the
magistrate of the county of which the offense is charged to have been
committed; or, if the offense be a misdemeanor, the defendant may
give bail before the magistrate for his appearance before the judge of
the county court of the county in which the offense was committed,
on the day to be named in the bail bond, or for his appearance before
the court having jurisdiction to try the offense, on the day to be fixed
by the magistrate."
These provisions must be complied with.
The defendant arrested the plaintiff on receiving a telegram from
Ohio charging her with receiving stolen goods. After proving her
innocence plaintiff sues defendant for false imprisonment. The court
sustained an instruction to the jury to find for the plaintiff "if you
believe that the defendant wrongfully and without having any reason-
able ground to believe plaintiff had committed a felony in Kentucky
arrested plaintiff Klotz v. Cook (1919), 184 Ky. 735, 212 S.
W 917.
The defendant was held liable for having the plaintiff arrested
as a suspect and not taking him before a magistrate. Sou. R. R. %n
Ky. v. Shtrley (1906), 121 Ky. 863, 28 Ky. L. Rep. 860, 90 S. W. 597.
The defendant, a private citizen, arrested plaintiff whom he thought
to be a fugitive from justice in Ohio for whose arrest a reward was
offered. He delivered the prisoner directly into the hands of the Ohio
officials. It was held that he was liable because he should have-taken
the prisoner before a Kentucky court. Botts v. Williams (1857), 56
Ky. 687.
A detective is guilty of false imprisonment for taking one arrested
A. L. I. RESTATEMENT OF LAW oF TORTS 323
to prison without first taking him before a court. L. d N. By. Co. v.
Offutt (1924), 204 Ky. 51, 263 S. W. 665.
A magistirate may restrain one legally brought before him for
a reasonable time while preparing for bond, etc. Meyers v. Dunn (1907),
126 Ky. 548, 31 Ky. L. R. 926, 104 S. W 352, 13 L. R. A. (N. S.) 881,
Pepper v. Mayes (1884), 81 Ky. 673, 5 Ky. L. Rep. 708.
(To be continued)
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